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Three Kinds of Idealization
Abstract
Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the intentional introduction of
distortion into scientific theories. Yet this recognition has not yielded consensus about the nature of
idealization. Thee literature of the past thirty years contains disparate characterizations and justifications, but
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forthcoming in e Journal of Philosophy  
 
Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the 
intentional introduction of distortion into scientific theories. Yet this recognition has not 
yielded consensus about the nature of idealization. e literature of the past thirty years 
contains disparate characterizations and justifications, but little evidence of convergence 
towards a common position.  
Despite this lack of convergence, consensus has clustered around three types of 
positions, or three kinds of idealization. While their proponents typically see these 
positions as competitors, I will argue that they actually represent three important strands 
in scientific practice. Philosophers disagree about the nature of idealization because there 
are three major reasons scientists intentionally distort their models and theories; all three 
kinds of idealization play important roles in scientific research traditions. 
e existence of three kinds of idealization means that some classic, epistemic 
questions about idealization will not have unitary answers. We cannot expect a single 
answer to questions such as: What exactly constitutes idealization? Is idealization 
compatible with realism? Are idealization and abstraction distinct? Should theorists work 
to eliminate idealizations as science progresses? Are there rules governing the rational use 
of idealization, or should a theorist’s intuition alone guide the process? However, the three 
kinds of idealization share enough in common to allow us to approach the answers to 
these questions in a unified way. e key is to focus not just on the practice and products 
of idealization, but on the goals governing and guiding it. I call these goals the 
                                                 
1 Many thanks to Peter Godfrey-Smith, Stephan Hartmann, Paul Humphreys, Steve Kimbrough, Ryan 
Muldoon, Michael Strevens, Ken Waters, and Deena Skolnick Weisberg for extremely helpful comments 
and advice. I am also grateful for the thoughtful questions and comments from audiences at the Minnesota 
Center for Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, The University of Pennsylvania, and Washington and 
Lee University, where earlier versions of this paper were presented. Thanks also to students in my graduate 
seminars at Penn for ongoing, stimulating discussion about idealization. The research in this paper was 
partially supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-0620887. 
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representational ideals of theorizing. Although they vary between the three kinds of 
idealization, attending to them will help us better understand the epistemic role of this 
practice. 
 
I.  ree Kinds of Idealization 
Since the early 1980s, philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the 
importance of idealization in scientific inquiry. While earlier literature acknowledged its 
existence, the pioneering studies of Nancy Cartwright2, Ernan McMullin3, Leszek Nowak4, 
William Wimsatt5, and others paved the way for the contemporary philosophical literature 
on the topic. rough much of my discussion, I will follow Cartwright’s characterization 
and talk about theoretical representation in terms of modeling, the indirect representation 
of real world phenomena with models.6 But many of the ideas in this paper are not 
essentially tied to modeling, so my reliance on the model-based idiom should not be seen 
as affirming this connection. 
One of the most important insights of the modern idealization literature is that 
idealization should be seen as an activity that involves distorting theories or models, not 
simply a property of the theory-world relationship. is suggests that in order to 
distinguish between the three types of idealization we will need to know what activity is 
characteristic of that form of idealization and how that activity is justified. ese activities 
and justifications can be grouped into three kinds of idealization: Galilean idealization, 
minimalist idealization, and multiple-models idealization.  
                                                 
2 Cartwight, N., How the Laws of Physics Lie, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198x) and Nature’s 
Capacities and Their Measurements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
3 Ernan McMullin, “Galilean Idealization,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, XVI (1985), pp. 
247-273.  
4 Leszek Nowak, “Laws of Science, Theories, Measurement,” Philosophy of Science,  XXXIX (1972), pp. 
533-548. 
5 Many of Wimsatt’s most important papers on idealization and related topics are collected in William 
Wimsatt, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations of Reality (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
6 For more detail about he practice of modeling, see Michael Weisberg, “Who is a Modeler?” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, LVIII (2007), 207-233. 
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Galilean idealization 
Galilean idealization is the practice of introducing distortions into theories with 
the goal of simplifying theories in order to make them computationally tractable. One 
starts with some idea of what a non-idealized theory would look like. en one mentally 
and mathematically creates a simplified model of the target. 
 Galilean idealization has been thoroughly characterized and defended by 
McMullin who sees the point of this kind of idealization as “grasp[ing] the real world 
from which the idealization takes its origin”7 by making the problem simpler, and hence 
more tractable. Galileo employed the technique both in theoretical and experimental 
investigations. Although this paper is concerned with the former, Galileo’s vivid 
description of the experimental version is useful for conceptualizing the basic notion of 
Galilean idealization. When discussing the determination of gravitational acceleration in 
the absence of a medium devoid of resistance, Galileo suggests a kind of experimental 
idealization: 
We are trying to investigate what would happen to moveables very diverse in 
weight, in a medium quite devoid of resistance, so that the whole difference of 
speed existing between these moveables would have to be referred to inequality of 
weight alone. … Since we lack such a space, let us (instead) observe what happens 
in the thinnest and least resistant media, comparing this with what happens in 
others less thin and more resistant.8  
Lacking a medium devoid of resistance, Galileo suggests that we can make some progress 
on the problem by initially using an experimental setup similar to the envisioned 
situation. Aer understanding this system, the scientist systematically removes the effect 
of the introduced distortion. e same type of procedure can be carried out in theorizing: 
introduction of distortion to make a problem more tractable, then systematic removal of 
the distorting factors. 
                                                 
7 McMullin, p. 248. A similar account is developed by Nowak; see Leszek Nowak, “The Idealizational 
Approach to Science: A Survey,” in J. Brzezinski and L. Nowak (eds.), Idealization III: Approximation and 
Truth, vol. 25 of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, pp. 9–63, 1992. 
Rodopi, Amsterdam. 
8 Quoted in McMullin, p. 267.  
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Galilean idealization is justified pragmatically. We simplify to more 
computationally tractable theories in order to get traction on the problem. If the theorist 
had not idealized, she would have been in a worse situation, stuck with an intractable 
theory. Since the justification is pragmatic and tied to tractability, advances in 
computational power and mathematical techniques should lead the Galilean idealizer to 
de-idealize, removing distortion and adding back detail to her theories. With such 
advances, McMullin argues, “models can be made more specific by eliminating 
simplifying assumptions and ‘de-idealization’, as it were. e model then serves as the 
basis for a continuing research program.”9 us the justification and rationale of Galilean 
idealization is not only pragmatic, it is highly sensitive to the current state of a particular 
science. 
Galilean idealization is important in research traditions dealing with 
computationally complex systems. Computational chemists, for example, calculate 
molecular properties by computing approximate wavefunctions for molecules of interest. 
At first, all but the simplest systems were intractable. When electronic computers were 
introduced to computational chemistry, calculated wavefunctions remained crude 
approximations, but more complex, chemically interesting systems could be handled. As 
computational power has continued to increase in the 21st century, it has become possible 
to compute extremely accurate (but still approximate) wavefunctions for moderate sized 
molecules. eorists in this tradition aim to develop ever better approximations for 
molecular systems of even greater complexity.10 ese techniques are still approximate, 
but research continues to bring computational chemists closer to the goal of “[calculating] 
the exact solution to the Schrödinger equation, the limit toward which all approximate 
methods strive.”11  
                                                 
9 McMullin, p. 261 
10 There are principled reasons why the exact wavefunction for multi-electron systems cannot be computed. 
However, there are no general, in-principle reasons why approximations of arbitrarily high degrees of 
accuracy and precision cannot be computed.  
11 J. B. Foresman and A. Frisch, Exploring Chemistry with Electronic Structure Methods, (Pittsburgh: 
Gausian Inc., 1996), p. 95. For a discussion of the relevant philosophical issues, see Paul Humphreys, 
“Computer Simulation,” PSA 1990, Volume 2, ed. A. Fine, M. Forbes, and L. Wessels (East Lansing: 
Philosophy of Science Association, 1992), pp.597-509 and Extending Ourselves, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
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is example nicely summarizes the key features of Galilean idealization. e 
practice is largely pragmatic; theorists idealize for reasons of computational tractability. 
e practice is also non-permanent. Galilean idealization takes place with the expectation 
of future de-idealization and more accurate representation. 
 
Minimalist idealization 
Minimalist idealization is the practice of constructing and studying theoretical 
models that include only the core causal factors which give rise to a phenomenon. Such a 
representation is oen called a minimal model of the phenomenon. Put more explicitly, a 
minimalist model contains only those factors that make a difference to the occurrence and 
essential character of the phenomenon in question.  
A classic example of a minimalist model in the physical sciences is the Ising model. 
is simple model represents atoms, molecules, or other particles as points along a line 
and allows these points to be in one of two states. Originally, Ernst Ising developed this 
model to investigate the ferromagnetic properties of metals. It was further developed and 
extended to study many other phenomena of interest involving phase changes and 
critical phenomena. e model is powerful and allows qualitative and some quantitative 
parameters of substances to be determined. But it is extremely simple, building in almost 
no realistic detail about the substances being modeled. What it seems to capture are the 
interactions and structures that really make a difference, or the core causal factors giving 
rise to the target phenomenon. 
Among recent discussions of idealization in the philosophical literature, minimalist 
idealization has been the most comprehensively explored position. As such, there is some 
diversity among the articulations of this position. One view is Michael Strevens’ kairetic 
account of scientific explanation. Strevens’ account of explanation is causal; to explain a 
phenomenon is to give a causal story about why that phenomenon occurred. What makes 
Strevens’ account distinct is that the explanatory causal story is limited to only those 
factors that made a difference to the occurrence of the phenomenon. “Making a 
difference” is a fairly intuitive notion, but Strevens defines it explicitly in terms of what 
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he calls “causal entailment,”12 which involves logical entailment in a causal model. A 
causal factor makes a difference to a phenomenon just in case its removal from a causal 
model prevents the model from entailing the phenomenon’s occurrence. A causal model 
of the difference-making factors alone is called a canonical explanation of the target 
phenomenon. 
For Strevens, idealization is the introduction of false but non-difference-making 
causal factors to a canonical explanation. In explaining Boyle’s law, for example, theorists 
oen introduce the assumption that gas molecules do not collide with each other. is 
assumption is false; collisions do occur in low-pressure gases. However, low-pressure gases 
behave as if there were no collisions. is means that collisions make no difference to the 
phenomenon and are not included in the canonical explanation. eorists’ explicit 
introduction of the no-collision assumption is a way of asserting that collisions are 
actually irrelevant and make no difference.13 Even with this added, irrelevant factor, the 
model is still minimalist because it accurately captures the core causal factors. 
Other accounts of minimalist idealization associate minimalism with generation of 
the canonical explanation alone. Robert Batterman’s account of asymptotic explanation is 
an example of such a view. Asymptotic methods are used by physicists to study the 
behavior of model systems at the limits of certain physical magnitudes. ese methods 
allow theorists to study how systems would behave when certain effects are removed, 
which allows the construction of “highly idealized minimal models of the universal, 
repeatable features of a system.”14 ese minimal models have a special role in physics 
because they can be used to explain universal patterns, common behaviors across material 
domains such as pressure, temperature, and critical phenomena. Adding more detail to the 
minimal model does not improve the explanations of these patterns; more details only 
allow a more thorough characterization of a highly specific event. Arguing in a similar 
vein, Stephan Hartmann describes cases where highly complicated systems are 
                                                 
12 Michael Strevens, “The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified—Causally,” Noûs, 
XXXVIII, pp. 154-176. 
13 Michael Strevens, “Why Explanations Lie: Idealization in Explanation,” unpublished manuscript, 
September 2004, p. 26. 
14  Robert W. Batterman, “Asymptotics and the Role of Minimal Models,” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, LIII (2002), 21-38. See also Robert W. Batterman, The Devil in the Details, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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characterized using physical models “of (simple) effective degrees of freedom,” which help 
to give us “partial understanding of the relevant mechanisms for the process under study.” 
is plays a cognitive role by allowing theorists “to get some insight into the highly 
complicated dynamics” of such systems.15 
Cartwright’s account of abstraction is also an example of what I call minimalist 
idealization.16 On her view, abstraction is a mental operation, where we “strip away—in 
our imagination—all that is irrelevant to the concerns of the moment to focus on some 
single property or set of properties, ‘as if they were separate.’” If the theorist makes a 
mathematical model of this abstract, real phenomenon, then she is in possession of a 
minimal model. Such a model can reveal the most important causal powers at the heart of 
a phenomenon.17  
 Despite the differences between minimalist idealization and Galilean idealization, 
minimalist idealizers could in principle produce an identical model to Galilean idealizers. 
For example, imagine that we wanted to model the vibrational properties of a covalent 
bond. A standard way to do this is to use a harmonic oscillator model. is model treats 
the vibrating bond as spring-like with a natural vibrational frequency due to a restoring 
force. is is a very simple representation of the vibrational properties of a covalent bond, 
but one that is commonly used in spectroscopy. Galilean idealizers would justify the use of 
this model by saying that it is pragmatically useful for calculating energies, thus avoiding 
having to calculate the many-dimensional potential energy surface for the whole 
molecule. Minimalist idealizers, however, would justify the use of this model by 
                                                 
15 Stephan Hartmann, “Idealization in Quantum Field Theory,” in N. Shanks (ed.), Idealization in 
Contemporary Physics, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp.99-122. 
16 Cartwright distinguishes this view from what she calls idealization, which is closer to Galilean 
idealization. In a more recent defense of this distinction, Martin Jones has cogently argued that abstraction 
is best seen as a kind of omission, whereas idealization is the assertion of falsehood. Cartwright’s and 
Jones’ proposal is perfectly reasonable—omission and distortion are distinguishable practices. However, 
since I am arguing for pluralism about the nature of idealization, I see no reason why we should not treat 
minimalist modeling as a form of idealization. See Martin R. Jones, “Idealization and Abstraction: A 
Framework,” in M.R. Jones and N. Cartwright (eds.), Idealization XII: Correcting The Model. Idealization 
and Abstraction in the Sciences (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), pp.173-217 for a careful defense of the 
alternative view.  Also see Paul Humphreys, “Abstract and Concrete,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, LV (1995), pp. 157-161 for a criticism of Cartwright’s view and an argument that idealization (in 
Cartwright’s sense) will almost always come along with abstraction in real scientific contexts. 
17 Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities, p. 187. 
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suggesting that it captures what really matters about the vibrations of covalent bonds. e 
extra detail in the full potential energy surface, they would argue, is extraneous. 
As this example illustrates, the most important differences between Galilean and 
minimalist idealization are the ways that they are justified. Even when they produce the 
same representations, they can be distinguished by the rationales they give for 
idealization. Further, while Galilean idealization ought to abate as science progresses, this 
is not the case for minimalist idealization. Progress in science and increases in 
computational power should drive the two apart, even if they generate the same model at 
a particular time. 
Just as there is no single account of minimalist idealization, there is no single 
account of its justification. However, all of the influential accounts described above agree 
that minimalist idealization should be justified with respect to the cognitive role of 
minimal models: they aid in scientific explanations. Hartmann argues that minimal 
models literally tell us how phenomena behave in a simpler world than our own. is 
gives us the necessary information to explain real-world phenomena. For Batterman, 
minimal models demonstrate how fundamental structural properties of a system generate 
common patterns among disparate phenomena. Strevens and Cartwright look at things 
more causally, describing the role of minimal models as showing us the causal factors that 
bring about the phenomenon of interest. In all of these cases, minimalist idealization is 
connected to scientific explanation. Minimal models isolate the explanatorily causal 
factors either directly (Cartwright and Strevens), asymptotically (Batterman), or via 
counterfactual reasoning (Hartmann). In each case, the key to explanation is a special set 
of explanatorily privileged causal factors. Minimalist idealization is what isolates these 
causes and thus plays a crucial role for explanation. is means that unlike Galilean 
idealization, minimalist idealization is not at all pragmatic and we should not expect it to 
abate with the progress of science. 
 
Multiple Models Idealization 
 Multiple-models idealization (hereaer, MMI) is the practice of building multiple 
related but incompatible models, each of which makes distinct claims about the nature 
and causal structure giving rise to a phenomenon. MMI is similar to minimalist 
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idealization in that it is not justified by the possibility of de-idealization back to the full 
representation. However, it differs from both Galilean and minimalist idealization in not 
expecting a single best model to be generated. is type of idealization is most closely 
associated with a distinctive kind of theorizing called modeling18 or model-based science19.  
 One most commonly encounters MMI in sciences dealing with highly complex 
phenomena. In ecology, for example, one finds theorists constructing multiple models of 
phenomena such as predation, each of which contains different idealizing assumptions, 
approximations, and simplifications. Chemists continue to rely on both the molecular 
orbital and valence bond models of chemical bonding, which make different, 
incompatible assumptions. In a dramatic example of MMI, the United States National 
Weather Service employs three complex models of global circulation patterns to model 
the weather. Each of these models contains different idealizing assumptions about the 
basic physical processes involved in weather formation. Although attempts have been 
made to build a single model of global weather, the NWS has determined that the best 
way to make high fidelity predictions is to employ all three models, despite the 
considerable expense of doing so.20  
 e literature about MMI is less well-developed then the others, so there is less of a 
clear consensus about its justification. But one especially important justification of MMI 
is the existence of tradeoffs, a position closely associated with biologist Richard Levins and 
his philosophical allies.21 is justification begins by noting that theorists have different 
goals for their representations, such as accuracy, precision, generality and simplicity. 
Levins further argues that these desiderata and others can trade off  with one another in 
                                                 
18 Weisberg, “Who is a Modeler?” 
19 Peter Godfrey-Smith, “The Strategy of Model Based Science,” Biology and Philosophy, XXI (2006), 
pp.725-640. 
20 Details about the three primary models, as well as a number of others employed by the NWS can be 
found at http://www.meted.ucar.edu/nwp/pcu2. 
21 Richard Levins, “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” in E. Sober (Ed.), Conceptual 
Issues in Evolutionary Biology (first edition),  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 18-27. Jay 
Odenbaugh, “Complex Systems, Trade-Offs and Mathematical Modeling: A Response to Sober and 
Orzack,” Philosophy of Science , LXX (2003), pp. 1496–1507. Michael Weisberg, “Qualitative Theory and 
Chemical Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, LXXI (2004), pp. 1071-1081; “Forty Years of ‘The 
Strategy’: Levins on Model Building and Idealization,” Biology and Philosophy, XXI (2006), pp.623-645. 
John Matthewson and Michael Weisberg, “The Structure of Tradeoffs in Scientific Modeling,” manuscript. 
For a critique of these ideas, see Steven H. Orzack and Elliott Sober, “A Critical Assessment of Levins’ 
‘The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,’” Quarterly Review of Biology, LXVIII (1993), 
pp. 533-546.  
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certain circumstances, meaning that no single model can have all of these properties to 
the highest magnitude. If a theorist wants to achieve high degrees of generality, accuracy, 
precision, and simplicity, she will need to construct multiple models. Levins summarizes 
his discussion of these issues as follows:  
e multiplicity of models is imposed by the contradictory demands of a complex, 
heterogeneous nature and a mind that can only cope with few variables at a time; 
by the contradictory desiderata of generality, realism, and precision; by the need 
to understand and also to control; even by the opposing esthetic standards which 
emphasize the stark simplicity and power of a general theorem as against the 
richness and the diversity of living nature. ese conflicts are irreconcilable. 
erefore, the alternative approaches even of contending schools are part of a 
larger mixed strategy. But the conflict is about method, not nature, for the 
individual models, while they are essential for understanding reality, should not be 
confused with that reality itself.22  
Our cognitive limitations, the complexity of the world, and constraints imposed by logic, 
mathematics, and the nature of representation, conspire against simultaneously achieving 
all of our scientific desiderata. us, according to Levins, communities of scientists should 
construct multiple models, which collectively can satisfy our scientific needs. 
 Several other justifications for MMI can be found in the literature. William 
Wimsatt argues that highly idealized models are important because, taken together, they 
help us develop truer theories.23 Population biologists Robert May and Joan Roughgarden 
argue that clusters of simple models increase the generality of a theoretical framework, 
which can lead to greater explanatory depth.24 Finally, Strevens’ account of idealization 
can also be used to justify MMI. For Strevens, a theorist first finds a minimal causal model 
for a phenomenon of interest. She idealizes when she makes this highly abstract model 
more concrete, and in doing so introduces (non-difference making) distortions. e 
                                                 
22 Levins, “The Strategy,” p. 431. 
23 William Wimsatt, “False Models as a Means to Truer Theories,” in M. Nitecki and A. Hoffmann (Eds.), 
Neutral models in biology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.23-55. 
24 Jonathan Roughgarden, Theory of Population Genetics and Evolutionary Ecology: An  
Introduction, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1979). Robert M. May, Stability  and Complexity In 
Model Ecosystems (Landmarks in Biology edition), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
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processes of filling in the minimal causal model with concrete details can be carried out in 
different ways, hence this process can yield multiple, idealized models. 
Some of these motivations suggest strong parallels between MMI and minimalist 
idealization. In some cases, one cannot build a single minimal model that contains all of 
the core causal factors for a class of phenomena. Yet it may be possible, in such cases, to 
build a small set of models, each of which highlights a different factor and which together 
account for all of the core causal factors. is motivation for MMI is parallel to the 
motivation for minimalist idealization, even though the practice itself is different.  
However, there are additional motivations for engaging in MMI that do not 
parallel the motivation for minimalist idealization. For example, modelers may engage in 
MMI strictly for the purpose of maximizing predictive power, as do the forecasters at the 
National Weather Service. Another instance of MMI may involve building a set of 
models that gives maximum generality, at the expense of capturing all of the core causal 
factors. Still another is the synthetic chemist or engineer’s motivation for MMI: to find 
the set of idealized models that is maximally useful for creating new structures. ere are 
thus many motivations for MMI. Some are pragmatic, where scientists are focused on 
prediction and structure construction, while some are explanatory and non-pragmatic. 
MMI also gives a complex, mixed answer about the permanence of idealization as 
science progresses. In some domains, MMI may abate with the progress of science. e 
National Weather Service may one day discover a single model that makes optimal 
predictions. However, if tradeoffs exist between theoretically important desiderata in a 
particular domain, then we should not expect MMI to abate with further progress. ese 
tradeoffs are consequences of logic and mathematics and thus present a permanent 
justification for MMI. 
 
From the discussion so far, it may seem that the literature on idealization describes a 
hodgepodge of disparate practices, leaving no hope for any further analysis of idealization 
simpliciter. is worry is not without merit because the methods, goals, and justifications 
of these three forms of idealization are quite distinct. Although a fully unified account of 
the three kinds of idealization is impossible, some progress can be made towards 
developing a unified framework with which to understand the practice of idealization in 
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general. is framework focuses on the goals associated with idealization, rather than the 
activities or products of it. I call these goals the representational ideals of idealization.  
 
II. Representational Ideals 
Representational ideals are the goals governing the construction, analysis, and 
evaluation of theoretical models. ey regulate which factors are to be included in models, 
set up the standards theorists use to evaluate their models, and guide the direction of 
theoretical inquiry. Representational ideals can be thought of as having two components: 
inclusion rules and fidelity rules. Inclusion rules tell the theorist which kinds of properties 
of the phenomenon of interest, or target system, must be included in the model, while 
fidelity rules concern the degrees of precision and accuracy with which each part of the 
model is to be judged.   
An important, albeit very simple, representational ideal is called COMPLETENESS, 
which is associated with classic accounts of scientific method. As such, it forms an 
important background against which every  kind of idealization can be discussed. 
 
COMPLETENESS 
According to COMPLETENESS, the best theoretical description of a phenomenon is 
a complete representation. e relevant sense of ‘completeness’ has two components 
associated with its inclusion rules and fidelity rules, respectively. e inclusion rules state 
that each property of the target phenomenon must be included in the model. 
Additionally, anything external to the phenomenon that gives rise to its properties must 
also be included in the model. Finally, structural and causal relationships within the target 
phenomenon must be reflected in the structure of the model. COMPLETENESS’ fidelity 
rules tell the theorist that the best model is one that represents every aspect of the target 
system and its exogenous causes with an arbitrarily high degree of precision and accuracy.  
e description of COMPLETENESS given so far is accurate, but potentially 
misleading. With very few exceptions, the inclusion and fidelity rules of COMPLETENESS 
set a goal that is impossible to achieve. Unless extremely self deceived, or in possession of 
an extremely simple and abstract target system, no theorist thinks that complete 
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representation is actually possible. Given the impossibility of achieving complete 
representation, how can COMPLETENESS  play a guiding role in scientific inquiry?  
Despite it unattainable demands, COMPLETENESS can guide inquiry in two ways. 
First, COMPLETENESS sets up a scale with which one can evaluate all representations 
including sub-optimal ones. If a theorist wants to rank several representations of the same 
phenomenon and has adopted COMPLETENESS, she has a straightforward way to do so. e 
closer a representation comes to completeness, the better it scores. I call this the evaluative 
function of the representational ideal because it sets the standards for evaluating sub-
optimal representations.  
e second and more important way that COMPLETENESS  can guide inquiry is 
through its regulative function. Regulative functions are similar to what Kant called 
regulative ideals. ey do not describe a cognitive achievement that is literally possible, 
rather, they describe a target or aim point. ey give the theorist guidance about what she 
should strive for and the proper direction for the advancement of her research program. If 
a theorist adopts COMPLETENESS, she knows that she should always strive to add more 
detail, more complexity, and more precision to her models. is will bring her closer to 
the ideal of completeness, although she will never fully realize this goal. 
COMPLETENESS  is a unique representational ideal because it directs theorists to 
include everything in their representations. All other ideals will build in some aspect of 
approximation or distortion. In thinking about ideals other than COMPLETENESS, we can 
begin to see the outline of a framework for characterizing the three kinds of idealization.  
Different kinds of idealization will be associated with different representational ideals. 
Before we carry this analysis forward, let us consider several additional representational 
ideals.  
 
SIMPLICITY 
Aer COMPLETENESS, the next most straightforward ideal is SIMPLICITY. e 
inclusion rule for this ideal councils the theorist to include as little as possible, while still 
being consistent with the fidelity rules. e fidelity rule for SIMPLICITY demands a 
qualitative match between the behavior of target system and the properties and dynamics 
of the model. 
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 SIMPLICITY is primarily employed by working scientists in two contexts.25 e 
first is pedagogical. Students are oen introduced to the simplest possible model that can 
make sense of the data, even where scientists believe that the model contains serious 
problems. One example of this is in the Lewis electron pair model of chemical bonding. 
is model is not even quantum mechanical, yet it can be used to account for many 
canonical molecular structures. Beginning students are introduced to this model as a way 
of building intuitions about chemical structure and reactivity.  
e second scientific context where SIMPLICITY is employed is when theorists 
construct models to test general ideas. “A minimal model for an idea tries to illuminate a 
hypothesis … [It] is not intended to be tested literally, any more than one would test 
whether the models for a frictionless pulley or a frictionless inclined plane are wrong.” 26 
is second use represents a motivation and justification for a particular kind of modeling 
in scientific practice. eorists oen begin a project by trying to determine what kind of 
minimal structures could generate a property of interest. ey do not need to know, at 
first, how a specific target system actually works. Once the dynamics are understood in 
simple models, theorists examine more complex models and empirical data to assess the 
plausibility of the simple model’s explanation of a real system’s behavior. 
 
1-CAUSAL 
is representational ideal instructs the theorist to include in the model only the 
core or primary causal factors that give rise to the phenomenon of interest. Put in the 
language of the causation literature, this ideal tells the theorist to only include the factors 
that made a difference. e theorist constructs a mathematical model of a much simpler 
system than the one actually being studied, one that excludes higher order causal factors. 
ese are the factors which make no difference to the occurrence of the phenomenon, but 
                                                 
25 There is also a long tradition which investigates the epistemic role of simple models. In some 
circumstances, it seems that simple models ought to be preferred because they are more likely to be true. 
This is a different kind of justification for the use of simple models than I am discussing in this article. For 
a recent defense of the possible epistemic significance of simplicity, see Malcom Forster and Eliott Sober, 
“How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate 
Predictions,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XLV (1994), pp. 1-35.  
26 Joan Roughgarden, Primer of Ecological Theory, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. x. 
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control the precise way in which the phenomenon occurs.27 is is closely related to 
SIMPLICITY, but unlike SIMPLICITY, 1-CAUSAL restricts the level of simplicity that is 
allowed. If we are trying to construct the simplest possible model that can make 
predictions qualitatively compatible with our observations, there is no restriction on the 
kind or number of causal factors that must be included. SIMPLICITY, for example, may 
allow us to neglect all quantum mechanical effects and use the Lewis model. 1-CAUSAL, 
however, would not sanction the use of such a model because it requires the theorist to 
include the quantum mechanical interactions that compose the core physical explanation 
of the structure. 
1-CAUSAL’s fidelity criteria make a considerable difference in determining when 
the theorist has constructed an adequate model because its inclusion rule (restriction to 
primary causal factors) is not very specific. In addition, the fineness of specification of the 
target phenomenon itself will make a difference to the kind of model we can build. 
Imagine that we wanted to build a 1-CAUSAL model for the maintenance of the sex ratio. 
We would need a more complex model to explain the 1.05:1 ratio of male to female 
Homo sapiens, than if we only were interested in why the sex ratio is roughly 50:50. Even 
holding the fidelity criteria fixed, the best model would be different in these two cases, 
with the former requiring greater specification of internal and external causal factors.  
Models generated using 1-CAUSAL are especially useful in two contexts. Like the 
models generated with SIMPLE, they can be used as starting points for the formulation and 
analysis of more complex models. 1-CAUSAL models are typically generated when one has 
a reasonably comprehensive understanding of how a system behaves, since knowing the 
primary causal factors that give rise to a phenomenon requires knowing quite a lot about 
the system. Further modeling from this point is usually aimed at greater quantitative 
accuracy, not deeper fundamental understanding.  
e second context where 1-CAUSAL is especially important involves scientific 
explanation. Several recent philosophical accounts of scientific explanation have pointed 
to the central role that primary causal factors—the factors that really make a difference—
                                                 
27 Of course which factors do and do not make a difference to the occurrence of a phenomenon must be 
judged with respect to how precisely the phenomenon is individuated. 
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play in scientific explanation.28 Recent work on the cognitive psychology of explanation 
has also emphasized the crucial role that picking out central causal factors plays in people’s 
judgments of explanatory goodness.29 In their methodological discussions, a number of 
other scientists have commented on this connection. For example, chemist Roald 
Hoffmann emphasizes that “… if understanding is sought, simpler models, not 
necessarily the best and predicting all observables in detail, will have value. Such models 
may highlight important causes and channels.” 30 ese accounts all suggest that models 
generated with 1-CAUSAL  seem to be at the heart of theorists’ explanatory practices. 
 
MAXOUT 
We now move from an ideal which looks superficially like SIMPLICITY to one that 
looks superficially like COMPLETENESS, the ideal called MAXOUT. is ideal says that the 
theorist should maximize the precision and accuracy of the model’s output. It says 
nothing, however, about how this is to be accomplished.  
One way to work towards this ideal is by constructing highly accurate models of 
every property and causal factor affecting the target. is is the same approach taken in 
COMPLETENESS, although the goal of MAXOUT is to achieve maximum output precision 
and accuracy, not a complete representation. A second option, one more commonly 
associated with MAXOUT, is to engage in model selection31, a process of using statistics to 
choose a functional form, parameter set, and parameter values which best fit a large data 
set. e model selected by these techniques is then continually optimized as further data 
comes in. Finally, MAXOUT also sanctions the use of black box models, the sort that have 
amazing predictive power, but for unknown reasons. ese may be discovered using 
model selection techniques, or may be discovered in a more serendipitous fashion.  
                                                 
28 James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). Michael Strevens, “The Causal and Unification Accounts of Explanation Unified – 
Causally”, Noûs, XXXVIII (2004), pp. 154–179. 
29 Tania Lombrozo, “The Structure and Function of Explanations,” Trends in Cognitive Science, X (2006), 
pp. 464-470. 
30 Roald Hoffmann, V. I. Minkin, and Barry K. Carpenter, “Ockham’s Razor and  
Chemistry,” Bulletin de la Société Chimique de France, CXXXIII (1996), pp. 117-130. 
31 Malcom R. Forster, “The New Science of Simplicity,” in Arnold Zellner, Hugo Keuzenkamp, and 
Michael McAleer (eds.), Simplicity, Inference and Modelling, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp. 83-117.  
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At first blush, it may seem unscientific to adopt an ideal that values predictive 
power over everything else. Most scientists believe that their inquiry is aimed at more 
than raw predictive power. While scientists want to know how a system will behave in the 
future, they also want an explanation of why it behaves the way that it does. MAXOUT 
ensures that we will generate models which are useful for predicting future states of the 
target system, but gives no guarantee that the models will be useful for explaining the 
behavior of the system.  
Nevertheless, representations generated by MAXOUT have their place in scientific 
inquiry. Explanation and prediction are clearly both important goals of scientists, but 
there is no reason that they must both be fulfilled with the same model. Theorists can 
adopt a mixed representational strategy, using different kinds of models to achieve 
different scientific goals. It may also be rational to elevate predictive power above all other 
considerations in some situations. Following his reflection on the importance of simple 
models quoted above, Hoffmann argues that “If predictability is sought at all cost—and 
realities of marketplace and judgments of the future of humanity may demand this—then 
simplicity may be irrelevant.”32  
 
P-GENERAL 
Generality is a desideratum of most models. is desideratum really has two 
distinct parts: a-generality and p-generality. A-generality is the number of actual targets a 
particular model applies to given the theorist’s adopted fidelity criteria. P-generality, 
however, is the number of possible, but not necessarily actual, targets a particular model 
captures.33 e representational ideal P-GENERAL says that considerations of p-generality 
should drive the construction and evaluation of theoretical models. 
While a-generality may seem like the more important kind of generality, theorists 
are oen interested in p-generality for several reasons. P-general models can be part of 
the most widely applicable theoretical frameworks, allowing real and non-real target 
systems to be compared. P-generality is also oen thought to be associated with 
                                                 
32 Hoffmann, “Ockham’s Razor and Chemistry”. 
33 For further discussion, see Weisberg, “Qualitative Theory and Chemical Explanation,” and Matthewson 
and Weisberg, “The Structure of Tradeoffs in Scientific Model Building.”  
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explanatory power. is can be seen in both the philosophical literature on explanation 
and in the comments of theorists. An excellent example of this can be found in R. A. 
Fisher’s discussion of modeling the non-actual. He begins by quoting Arthur Eddington: 
 We need scarcely add that the contemplation in natural science of a wider 
domain than the actual leads to a far better understanding of the actual.34 
Fisher goes on to argue:  
[for] a biologist, speaking of his own subject, [this] would suggest an 
extraordinarily wide outlook. No practical biologist interest in sexual reproduction 
would be led to work out the detailed consequences experienced by organisms 
having three or more sexes; yet what else should he do if he wishes to understand 
why the sexes are, in fact, always two?35 
e key to understanding this actual system, Fisher argues, is to understand a possible, but 
non-actual one. In the behavior of this non-actual three-sex system lies the key to 
understanding why the two-sex system evolved. Some recent philosophical accounts of 
scientific explanation also stress the importance of p-generality to explanation.36  
P-GENERAL can also play a subtler regulative role. Instead of trying to understand 
specific targets, theorists may wish to understand fundamental relationships or 
interactions, abstracted away from real systems. For example, ecologists may wish to study 
predation or competition, far removed from the interactions of particular species. In such 
cases, P-GENERAL is oen adopted, guiding theorists to develop models that can be 
applied to many real and possible targets. is exploratory activity is a very important 
part of modern theoretical practice, although we do not yet have good philosophical 
account of how it works.37 One thing we do know, however, is that there is a delicate 
                                                 
34 Fisher, R. A., The Genetical theory of Natural Selection, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. viii-
ix, quoting Eddington’s The Nature of the Physical World. 
35 Fisher, pp. viii-ix. 
36 Michael Strevens, “The Causal and Unification Accounts,” James Woodward, Making Things Happen, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
37 Some aspects of this exploratory mode of theorizing are discussed in Richard Levins, “The Strategy of 
Model Building”; William Wimsatt, “Robustness, Reliability and Overdetermination,” in M. Brewer and B. 
Collins (Eds.), Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences , (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981), pp. 124–
163; Michael Weisberg, “Robustness Analysis,” Philosophy of Science, forthcoming; Patrick Forber, “On 
Biological Possibility and Confirmation,” unpublished manuscript.  
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balance between achieving deep and insightful p-generality and low-fidelity, 
uninformative p-generality, generated by overly simplistic models. 
 
 We have now looked at a number of representational ideals, the goals that guide 
theoretical inquiry. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, representational 
ideals are at the core of the practice of idealization and a systematic account of them can 
ultimately lead us to a more unified understanding of idealization. To that end, we now 
turn back to the three kinds of idealization and consider which representational ideals are 
associated with them. 
 
III. Idealization and Representational Ideals 
Recall that Galilean idealization is the practice of introducing distortions into 
theories in order to simplify them and make them computationally tractable. It is justified 
pragmatically, introduced to make a model more computationally tractable, but with the 
ultimate intention of de-idealizing, removing any distortion, and adding detail back to 
the model. Models generated by Galilean idealization are thus approximate, but carry with 
them the intention of further revision, ultimately reaching for a more precise, accurate, 
and complete model. e ultimate goal of Galilean idealization is complete 
representation; its representational ideal is thus COMPLETENESS. 
Minimalist idealizers are not interested in generating the most truthful or accurate 
model. Rather, they are concerned with finding minimal models, discovering the core 
factors responsible for the target phenomenon. Minimalist idealizers thus adopt the 
representational ideal 1-CAUSAL, the ideal that says the best model is the one that includes 
the primary causal factors that account for the phenomenon of interest, up to a suitable 
level of fidelity chosen by the theorist. While Minimalist idealizers may sometime look 
like they are adopting SIMPLICITY, this is almost always inaccurate, because theorists 
engage in minimalist idealization to really understand how the target phenomena work 
and why they behave the way that they do. is requires finding the causal factors that 
really do make a difference, not a model that simply can reproduce the phenomenon 
qualitatively. 
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 Like Galilean idealization’s representational ideal, minimalist idealization’s ideal 
also demands the construction of a single model for a particular target or class of target 
phenomena. One typically engages in minimalist idealization in order to generate 
explanatory models. Such models tend to be ones that simultaneously unify many target 
phenomena into a class and identify the causal factors which really make a difference.  For 
the class of phenomenon of interest, this will mean finding a single model, despite the 
fact that it will leave out quite a lot of detail which accounts for the uniqueness of each 
target. 
 Finally, we can consider MMI. e biggest difference between MMI and the other 
kinds of idealization is that there is no single representational ideal which is characteristic 
of it. Pretty much any representational ideal—including 1-CAUSAL and in rare cases 
COMPLETENESS —can play a role in this form of idealization. MMI arises because of the 
existence of tradeoffs between different theoretical desiderata. is suggests that not all 
desiderata are simultaneously maximizable, at least in a single model. us the most 
significant aspect of MMI is that it instructs theorists to construct a series of models which 
pursue different desiderata and are guided by multiple representational ideals. 
 Consider, for example, the ecological research program that is concerned with 
understanding predation. A cursory look at the ecological literature on predation, reveals 
little in the way of the search for a single, best model of predation. Instead, one finds a 
series of models, some of which are more precise and accurate, some of which are more 
qualitative, some of which are very well suited for populations that are homogenously 
distributed in space, and some of which are flexible enough to deal with complex spatial 
structure. is situation is the norm in theoretical ecology. As John Maynard Smith 
explained, “For the discovery of general ideas in ecology … different kinds of 
mathematical description, which may be called models, are called for.”38 
 For modern ecologists pursuing MMI, a full understanding of the ecological world 
is going to depend on multiple, overlapping, possibly incompatible models. How might 
we justify this kind of pluralism? One possible approach is anti-realist. We could argue 
that maximizing empirical adequacy in some cases requires the use of multiple models. 
                                                 
38 John Maynard Smith, Models in Ecology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p.1. 
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Since anti-realism only requires that models be empirically adequate, the use of different 
kinds of idealized models is unproblematic.  
 is line of response is available to anti-realists, but neglects some of the 
motivations for building multiple models that theorists have discussed in the literature. 
e same ecologists who champion the use of multiple models very explicitly describe this 
practice as aimed at having a more complete understanding of the phenomena of interest, 
not simply making accurate predictions. As Levins puts it, “[O]ur truth is at the 
intersection of independent lies.”39 is is clearly a realist sentiment. To understand if it is 
justified we must ask whether the use of multiple idealized models, or the use of any 
idealized models at all, is compatible with scientific realism. 
 
IV. Idealization, Representational Ideals, and the Aims of Science 
 Peter Godfrey-Smith gives the following helpful formulation of scientific realism: 
“One actual and reasonable aim of science is to give us accurate descriptions (and other 
representations) of what reality is like. is project includes giving us accurate 
representations of aspects of reality that are unobservable.”40 e realist thus believes that 
scientists aim and sometimes succeed at representing this external, independent reality, 
while anti-realists demur, at least when it comes to unobservables. 
 Prima facie, idealization looks like it might cause problems for scientific realism. 
All three forms of idealization involve the willful distortion of scientific representations. 
Willful distortion and approximation appears to militate against Godfrey-Smith’s 
conception of realism, because the theorist is not even aiming to give an accurate 
description of what mind-independent reality is like. Despite this, I think all three kinds 
of idealization are compatible with the sort of realism sketched by Godfrey-Smith, if his 
definition is understood in a broad and sophisticated way. 
 Galilean idealization is the most straightforwardly compatible with scientific 
realism. Galilean idealizers oen fall short of their representational ideal of COMPLETENESS 
and may even do so willingly. However, in the long run, the Galilean idealizer does aim 
to give complete, non-distorted, perfectly accurate representations. In order to 
                                                 
39 Levins, “The Strategy of Model Building.” 
40 Godfrey-Smith, P., Theory and Reality, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003),p.176 
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accommodate the possibility of Galilean idealization, scientific realists need to understand 
that achieving accurate representations of complex phenomena is an ongoing process. 
Even when the short-term practice involves the willful introduction of distortion, the 
long-term aim can still be to give an accurate representation of what reality is really like.  
us scientific realism is perfectly compatible with Galilean idealization, if the realist aim 
is understood to be long-term or ultimate. 
 Minimalist idealization and MMI present more serious challenges to scientific 
realism. It will not be possible for minimalist and MMI idealizers to assent to at least one 
interpretation of Godfrey-Smith’s formulation because they do not ever aim to give a 
fully accurate representation of reality. However, defenders of minimalist idealization aim 
to uncover real causal structure, or fundamental patterns in common between multiple 
phenomena. is suggests that a weaker reading of Godfrey-Smith’s formulation, which 
does not require fully accurate representations, is compatible with minimalist idealization. 
ere are other respects in which minimalist idealization is compatible, and indeed 
demands a kind of realism. Consider the goals and justification of minimalist idealization: 
Minimalist idealizers are trying to model the most important causal factors that underlie 
the properties and behaviors of target phenomena. at is, they oen recognize that real 
scientific explanation involves the identification of the core causal factors giving rise to 
the system, not all of the details. is recognition is surely a realist one. While minimalist 
idealizers are decidedly not interested in the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, they want to know the truth about what really matters. For their explanatory 
interests, representation of just a few key factors is what matters. is representation must 
be accurate.  
 Finally, consider multiple models idealization. As this constitutes a more diverse 
set of practices, it is much harder to make a unified judgment about the degree of realism 
embodied by MMI. Some kinds of representational ideals are clearly not realist. For 
example, the ideal MAXOUT tells the theorist that she should seek maximal precision and 
accuracy in the output of her model. However, this ideal provides no guidance about the 
internal structure of the model and is compatible with black-box models.  MAXOUT is also 
compatible with models that are willfully distorted with the sole aim of making the 
predictions more accurate. So clearly a practice of idealization that only uses MAXOUT is 
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incompatible with realism. In such a case, theorists do not aim to give accurate 
representations of the underlying reality of their target phenomena. 
 As I described it, however, MMI transcends relying on any one kind of 
representational ideal. It is a strategy for investigating phenomena when complexity and 
tradeoffs preclude the accomplishment of this in a single model. When a theorist chooses 
to engage in MMI because her system is complex, but nevertheless wants to develop an 
accurate description of her target phenomenon, she is acting in a realist fashion. At least 
one aim of her practice is the development of a mind-independent picture of a real-world 
phenomenon. is attitude is also clearly realist in spirit, despite the fact that it will be 
strictly incompatible with Godfrey-Smith’s definition of realism.  
Indeed, there can be several realist dimensions of MMI. Typical episodes of MMI 
employ a package of representational ideals, which taken together, aim to give an accurate 
representation of real world systems. While no single model may contain the complete 
picture of the properties and behavior of a complex system, a collection of them can. 
Levins and Maynard Smith advocate the use of multiple models precisely because a 
collection of ecological models will give a more accurate representation of the behavior of 
real world ecosystems then any single one does. 
e recognition that multiple models can give a more accurate and informative 
representation of real world systems is itself another realist dimension of MMI, in fact 
one might call it a higher order realist motivation for MMI. Multiple models idealization 
is justified by the existence of tradeoffs between theoretically important desiderata such a 
simplicity, accuracy, precision, and generality.  If these tradeoffs exist in the way many 
scientists and philosophers believe that they do, adopting theoretical strategies that 
recognize them is the proper realist response. Where tradeoffs exist, the realist should not 
be content to choose a single, most accurate model. Such a strategy ignores important 
discoveries about the world, in this case about our representational capacities. When faced 
with tradeoffs and complex systems, the realist should surely follow the Levinsonian 
strategy of multiple-model use.  
 e goal of this discussion of realism is to show that, despite prima facie concerns 
about the incompatibility of idealization and realism, all three kinds of idealization can be 
made compatible with sophisticated forms of realism. A more detailed study of these issues 
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would look more carefully at each representational ideal and consider the extent to which 
its fidelity criteria and inclusion rules are compatible with realism and other scientific 
desiderata.  
 
 
What, then, have we learned about idealization and its justification? I have 
endeavored to show that the three kinds of idealization recognized in the philosophical 
literature are not competitors, but reflect three practices important to scientific inquiry. 
What distinguishes them is not the product of their application, but rather the 
representational ideals which guide theorists in using them. ere is no single, over-
arching justification for idealization. Differing representational ideals respond to the 
demands of a complex world in different ways. is precludes a single justification for 
idealization.  
  
#### 
